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Abstract
Since Dorfman (1969), Shell (1969), and Intrilligator (1971) the dynamic
price theory has been based on the economic interpretation oF shadow pri-
ces in optimal control theory. This interpretation, however, lacks one
vital link: it does not offer an economic explanation of the jump of the
co-state variables in problems with pure state constraints. This explana-
tion is presented in this article.
Firstly, we describe an economy with irreversible investments following
the analysis of Van Hilten (1990). In that case it appears that the jump
in the co-state variable is explainable: it is caused by a sudden change
in the cost of capital and, therefore, in the net present value. In gene-
ral it follows that the co-state variables provide the marginal value of
the corresponding state variable; the economic interpretation of the co-
state variable is, also at the moment of the jump, perfectly clear.
1. Introduction
The general control model is:
T
max f F(x,u,t)dt f S(x(T),T)
u 0





where u is the control variable and x is the state variable. With suitable
assumptions of the functions involved we define
L(x.u.~~.a.N.v.t) - a~F 4~f t ug t vh
with constant a~ 2 0, co-state variables ~(t), multipliers u(t) and v(t)
and L jointly concave in x and u.
The usual economic interpretation is as follows:
~i(t) - the value of the co-state variable i; the rate of change of
the maximum attainable value of the objective function as a
consequence of the marginal change of the state variable
ui(t), vj(t) - the Lagrange multiplier which indicates how much the opti-
mal value of the objective function improves with a margi-
nal increase of an additional condition gi 2 0 or hj z 0.
Many authors ( Sorger ~989, Seierstad and Sydsaeter 1977 and 1987) have
considered models with state constraints. At points of time when h(x,t) z
0 is binding. In principal a discontinuity in a(t) can occur and it can be
described by using a jumpparameter r~(T). In the case the discontinuity
occurs at t - T:
~(T}) - a(T-) ; n(T)h.
Conditions under which such a jump does not occur at all has been descri-
bed in the literature (Feichtinger and Hartl 1986).3
The essential problem is how to explain in economic terms the occurrence
of jumps in a(t). At first sight such jumps seem hard to understand becau-
se "the co-state variable captures all future effects over change in the
state variables .. , the firm "knows" that the constraint will become
active: why is that knowledge not incorporated in the value of a(t)?" (Van
Hilten 1990). So far no economic explanation has been offered and this is
a serious lack (Feichtinger and Hartl 1986).
In another ímportant line in the literature the irreversibility of in-
vestments and labour are analysed (Johanssen 1959. Arrow en Kurz 1970,
Nickell 19~4, Leban and Lesourne 1983, Pindyck 1988, Olsen 1989). Because
of "the fact that, once a firm has acquired capital stock and "bolted down
the machinery", possibilities of subsequent decumulation are severely
limited. The optimal policy for the firm will thus consist of segments of
positive and zero investments with periodic jumps in capacity, typically
corresponding to downward jumps in the marginal opportunity cost" (Nickell
1974). This investment "irreversibility usually arised because capital is
industry or firm specific, that is, it cannot be used in a different in-
dustry or by a different firm" (Pindyck 1988) with "the impossibility of
charging at will the manning of capital equipment once constructed"
(Johanssen 1959).
In this paper these two lines are combined. The jump in the co-state va-
riables is explained in a model with irreversible investments, which con-
firms the development link in dynamic price theory.
2. Model formulation
A well-known example of an optimal control model is a dynamic model of the
Firm (Van Hilten 1990) in which two fundamental issues of the economy are
combined, namely:
1. investments are irreversible and
2. the firm operates within an environment of a real business cycle
T
Max J exp(-it)D(t)dt t exp(-iT)X(T) (1)
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D(t) : dividend rate
X(t) : stock of equity
K(t) : stock of capital
Q(t) : production rate
S(t) : sales rate - Q(t)p(t)
L(t) : labour
Y(t) : stock of debt
T : horizon date
a : depreciation rate
b : maximal debt-equity ratio
i: corporate profit tax rate
f : shareholder's time preference
k : capital-output ratio
1 : labour-output ratio
p : price of output
r : rate of interest
w : wage rate
Furthermore,5
S(t) - Q(t)p(t) - Q(t){exp(-gt)Q(t)}{exp(-l~e)}, t s iu (12)
- Q(t){exp((m-g)t-mzu)Q(t)}{exp(-1~6)}, Tu s t s Td (13)
- Q(t){exp(-gt)exp(m(Td-TU)){Q(t){exp(-1~E)}, t z Td (14)
in which:
E - price elasticity of demand
g - growth rate of the demand function
m-g - decrease rate of the demand function
In this shareholder's value maximizing firm (1) financed by equity and
debt (10), the usual formula of net investment applies (2) and given the
Leontief technology, production and labour are a linear function of the
stock of capital goods (11). The state equation (4) defines, that the
sales after deduction of wages, depreciation interest and profit taxation
can be used to pay dividends or to increase equity.
The business cycle given by (12), (13), (14), is based on Nickell (19~4)
and Leban and Lesourne (1983). If we assume that E~ 1 and m ) g the gra-
fical form is (Van Hilten 1990):
P
Q(t-tf)
Figure 1. The demand function (suffix f- fixed).
ti~ ~(Q - Qf)
In this article we describe the case of an hidden business cycle (E z 1;
m~~ g; (g-a) : E-v(1-f) ) 0, i((1-f)r), because we use this model to
explain the jumps of the co-state variables and under these conditions
jumps exist.6
j. The optimal policy
We define
~1 - the co-state variable of capital
X2 - the co-state variable of equity
1~1 - the Lagrange multiplier belonging to restriction (6) (invest-
ment)
u2 - the Lagrange multiplier belonging to restriction (7) (divi-
dend)
vl - the Lagrange multiplier belonging to restriction (8) (minimum
conditions of debt)
v2 - the Lagrange multiplier belonging to restriction ( 9) (maximum
conditions of debt)
Hence the Lagrangian is represented by
L-~OD t al(I-aK) t~2{{(1-f)S(K,t) - Wk K- aK - rK t rX} - D}
t ulI t u2D t vl(K-X) . v2{(ltb)X-K}. (15)
In appendix 1 the optimality conditions are described. According to Van
Hilten (1990) the solution in the case of a severe recession is presented





ti~ T~ ti~ tiz Td T3 ~4
Investment (I) t p 0 p }
Dividend ( D) t t 0 t }
~1 } - - - t
~Z 1 1 ~1 1 1
ul 0 t t t 0
u2 0 0 ' 0 0
L1
During the period 21, T4 the firm does not invest because an extra capital
good causes a decrease of the Hamiltonian, i.e. ~1 C 0. In the lowest
point of the recession the firm has to borrow money (v - 0) to pay the 1 wages because of the negative accounting cash flow. If D- 0, I- 0 and
Y) 0 the latter can be expressed as: (1-f){S(Q,t) - wL - rY}.
The development of the total path proceeds as follows: at the top of a
boom period, investments are reduced as there is an expectation of lower
sales in subsequent periods. Because of the higher prices, sales increase.
After the peak (TU), a turning point is reached at T1.
The marginal return of capital (al) is8
T
~1(T1) - I {exp - (ita)(t-T1)}(1-f){~K - (Wk t a t llf)}dt - 0
T1
(16)
So firms invest until the marginal costs of investment (wages wl~k, depre-
cíation a and net capital cost i~(1-f)) is equal to the shadow price of
installed capital (~S~~K) and therefore net present value in terms of
revenues and costs of the invested dollar is zero (Kort 199o defined the
net present value in terms of cash flows).
From that time-point on the capital goods surplus decreases by aK; al(t)
being negative indicates that a large decrease of K yields advantages, but
such a drop (x ) 0) is not possible because of the irreversibility con-
straint (6) (Nickell 19~5). A negative marginal price is assocíated with
this investment-irreversibility constraint (Olsen 1989).
The accounting cash flow surplus will be distributed as dividends (D ) 0;
x2 - 0), since lending is not possible (Y 2 0; vl ~(1-f)r - i) 0).
After T2 the accounting cash flow is negative because the cash inflow of
sales is lower than the cash outflow of the wages. This liquidity shortage
can be eliminated only by borrowing. After the lowest point in the reces-
sion has been reached (Td) the accounting cash flow is positive and so the
firm can pay off its debts. The T3, T4 period has the same characteristics
as il, T2, while after T4 the boom period with positive net investments
follows.
This description has been given by many authors. Nickell, among others,
points to "the downward jump in the marginal opportunity cost" (see also
Katayama 1989) and Bertola and Caballero 199o indicate "the wedge ...
between the cost of capital and the marginal contribution to profit".
At T2 there are jumps in the co-state variables from which the graphic
representation is presented in Figure 3.9
S 2 I
Figure 3. The jump of the co-state variables.
The jump is
-~tl(i2) - R2(T2) - exp{(1-f)r - i)(T3-TZ)} - 1 - N2(Tz) (17)
This equation will be economically explained in the next section.
4. The economic explanation oP the jump
Let us study the development over time of the co-state variable ~2(t). In
general, the value of the co-state variable is equal to the change of the
value function arising from a marginal increase of the corresponding state
variable. In this model a2 corresponds to the state variable X(t). Hence,
in order to interpret the development of a2 we have to establish the
change of the value function due to an additional increase of the value of
equity, X(t), at each moment in time, which is done below:10
TO S t ~ TZ : a2 - 1
One extra unit of equity will be used to pay out dividend.
Therefore the objective increases by one (cf. (1) and notice
that a2(t) is a current value co-state variable).
TZ s t C T3 : a2 - exp{((1-f)r-i)(T3-t)}
When the firm has one extra unit of equity at its disposal,
it can diminish its amount of debt money, needed to finance
the expenses of the firm (i.e. paying wages and interest),
by one dollar. Hence, according to continuous corresponding,
the amount of interest the firm has to pay diminishes by
exp{(1-f)r(T3-t)} (notice that Y(t) - 0 for t~ T3). Because
the value of the co-state variable is measured at time point
t we have to discount the interest payments back to t, so
X2(t) - exp{(1-f)r-i)(T3-t)}.
T3 s t t T4 : a2 - 1
Again the extra unit of equity will be used to pay out
dividend.
From the above we can conclude that there are two possible time-points at
which a2 can jump: T2 and T3,
TZ - X2(T2) ' 1 the jump is
a2(T2) - exp{(1-f)r - i}(T3-T2) exp{(1-f)r - i}(T -T )- 1
3 2




In the example used in Section 3 the model is determined at the moment of
the jump by the constraints: the state constraints allow the model no
further freedom. The control variable which influences the state variable
X and so the F(x,u,t), is then totally fixed as a result of the invest-
ments and the accounting cash flow F(x,u,t) - FD(t) (Sorger 1989).11
"The restriction on the control variables force the firm to leave or to
enter the boundary. At time T2 investments and dividends have reached
their lower bound. Thus the firm has no choice" (Van Hilten 1990) "At this
extreme there may be no real choice at all if the constraints are so res-
trictive that only one reasonable option is really available to the plan-
ner" (Dreze 1990). There is therefore no "competitive path" (Sorger 1989b)
or trajectory. Only afterwards the firm can use the positive cash inflow
for dividends or investment so that there will be other possible paths.
In economic terms the jump is perfectly clear: at T2 the disadvantage of
the extra loan for this marginal investment must of course be fully ame-
liorated by this investment, but only for the period that the investment
is financed by expensive money (similar to jump, described by Turnovsky
(1990) as an accumulation effect in response of the increase in taxes) and
the cost of capital is higher because of the high interest rate.
5. The general explanation
Optimal control theory, in addition to the well-known mathematical deriva-
tions, also allows an economic interpretation: first of all aj(t) always
gives the cumulative value of the marginal change, thus, the jump in ~j(t)
also gives a cumulative assessment. Furthermore, aj(t) is equal to the
shadow price for the current Xj(t). If a condition if now placed on X, at
J Tj, aj(t) will also adjust to the changed situation and remain so for the
entire adjustment period.
To arrive at the correct economic explanation of the jump in the co-state
variables in optimal control problems with state constraints, it is neces-
sary explain the well known definition of these co-state variables namely:
aj(Ti) is the rate of change of the maximum attainable value of the objec-
tive function as a consequence of a marginal change of the state variable.
When there is a break in the current state, a jump can occur in Xj(Ti),
which can be explained in economic terms by the cumulative (dis)advantages
of the marginal adjustment of the state constraint.12
6. An addendum: the economic ridge
Developments in the values of the co-state variables and the parameters
are also based on the comparison of the given state with and without the
marginal changes. To explain the shadow prices, the additional conditions
are related by a marginal increase and the effect on the objective func-
tion is measured. To use an analogy, if in climbing a mountain the minima-
lization of the distance to the top is the objective, a measure of how
much the distance to the top increases is made for every deviation from
the optimal path.
The economic analysis is fundamentally different if no alternatives are
available. In that case there is only one criterion, i.e. a direct con-
frontation with the objective. To extend the mountainclimbing analogy: a
ridge has no alternative. The ridge has to be taken to reach the top. The
distance of the ridge is a given for the objective function and there is
no alternative.
In this example: at T2 the firm reaches the ridge and remains on the ridge
until T3. From the very first step, he can see the entire length of the
path: the longer the time interval starting at T2 and ending at i3 the
greater the influence at the ridge on the value of the objective. The
value of Xj(Ti) depends on the current state Xj(Ti), Crossing the ridge
the co-state variable can jump.
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Appendix 1. Optimality conditions
L- XOD t al(I-aK) t X2{(1-f)(S(K.t) - k I K- aK - rK . rX} - D} .
4 ulI t u2D f vl(K-X) . v2((ltb)X-K)
bI - 0 ; X1 ' ul - 0
bD - 0 ; 1- a2 t u2 - 0
X1 - -bK ; ial - (i'a)al , X2(1-f){-óK
} kI } a } r} - vl } v2
a2 - bX 4 iX2 -(i-(1-F)r)a2 t vl -(1}b)y2
ulI - 0 , ~,,2D - 0
vl(K-X) - 0, v2{(ltb)X - K} - 0
al(T) --x2 t a~l . a2(T) - 1 t( 14b)~2 -~i
~1{K(T) - X(T)} - 0 , ~r2{(l.b)X(T) - K(T)} - 0
X1(~1) - X1(Ti) - ~1(~i) . ~2(~i)
~Z(2i) - ~Z(Ti) t ~1(Ti) - (l tb)~2(T1)
nl(Ti){K(il) - X(Ti)} - 0. n2(Ti){(ltb)X(Ti) - K(2i)} - 014
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